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vych	 and	his	 government	 developed	 an	 ambitious	 and	 com-
prehensive	 programme	 of	 reforms	 across	 the	 key	 areas	 of	
social	 and	 political	 life.	A	 return	 to	 the	 presidential	 system	





•	 The	 constitutional	 changes,	which	 have	 given	 the	 president	
















ly	 on	 the	 condition	of	 the	Ukrainian	 economy).	The	official	
goal	of	many	of	the	reforms	was	to	bring	Ukrainian	legisla-
tion	in	line	with	EU	law,	which	correlated	with	the	intense	
negotiations	 between	 Kiev	 and	 Brussels	 on	 an	 Association	
















was	 seen	as	 a	great	 success	 and	a	 sign	of	 the	government’s	
administrative	efficiency.












even	 poorer.	 The	 authorities	 have	 failed	 to	 introduce	many	
long-awaited	 and	 fundamental	 reforms	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 local	
government,	municipal	infrastructure	and	housing	(the	gov-
ernment	has	now	been	working	on	 this	 legislation	 for	 eight	






of	 amendments	 to	 the	 document.	 These	 amendments	 have	
been	 aimed	at	 excluding	 the	 compulsory	use	 of	 transparent	
tendering	 procedures.	 Similarly,	 the	 highly	 publicised	 anti-
corruption	campaign	has	turned	into	a	complete	failure.
•	 The	 reformist	 zeal	 of	Ukraine’s	 political	 elite	 had	 been	 pro-
gressively	 diminishing	 as	 the	 parliamentary	 election	 ap-
proached	and	the	polls	showed	a	decline	 in	support	for	both	








































Ukraine’s	 political	 and	 economic	 transformation	 after	 1991	was	
much	more	difficult	and	happened	more	slowly	than	in	the	neigh-
bouring	 countries	 across	 Central	 Europe	 and	 the	 Baltic	 region.	
This	was	partly	due	to	the	seeming	lack	of	prospects	for	EU	mem-
bership,	seen	as	the	main	stimulus	for	change	in	Central	Europe	
in	 the	 1990s,	and	more	recently	also	 in	 the	Balkans.	Even	more	
important,	however,	may	have	been	the	different	socio-historical	
experiences	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 people	 and	 the	 different	mental-
ity	of	 their	political	elite.	 In	 the	first	 few	years	as	an	 independ-
ent	 state,	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 Ukraine	
faced	challenges	on	a	scale	unseen	elsewhere	in	Central	Europe.	
It	witnessed	the	collapse	of	entire	industries	(including	its	heavy	





small	 society’	model,	were	 now	 forced	 to	 find	ways	 to	 survive,	
with	 no	 hope	 of	 help	 from	 the	 state.	 The	 situation	was	 further	


































these	businesses	were	 instrumental	 in	 spearheading	 the	neces-
sary	privatization,	on	the	other	hand,	they	prevented	attempts	at	




















ment	 and	 consequently	 became	 the	 country’s	most	 powerful	 po-
litical	figure	since	independence.	Furthermore,	both	the	president	
and	his	party	enjoyed	a	relatively	high	level	of	public	support.
















camp’,	but	also	 to	carry	out	 far-reaching	reform	of	 the	state	ap-





-2014	 entitled	 “Wealthy	 society,	 competitive	 economy,	 effective	
state”,	which	constituted	 the	first	concrete	plan	 for	comprehen-
sive	reform	 in	years.	 Its	broad	scope	attempted	 to	address	most	
of	 the	challenges	facing	Ukraine,	ranging	from	the	stabilisation	
of	 the	 economy	 following	 the	 severe	 economic	 crisis,	 through	










hensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 individual	 reforms	







1	 Full	version	available	from:	Заможне суспільство, конкурентоспроможна 




















lution	 to	 succeed	 in	 late	2004	was	Viktor	Yushchenko’s	 consent	
for	an	amendment	to	the	1996	Constitution,	which	would	change	
the	country’s	system	of	government	from	presidential	 to	parlia-
























delegation	 was	 officially	 headed	 by	 Khandogiy;	Огрызко рассказал, как 


























After	 Yanukovych’s	 victory	 in	 the	 2010	 presidential	 election,	







would	 continue,	 even	 if	 Yushchenko	 was	 replaced	 by	 Yanuko-














































opposition	 politicians	 grounds	 to	 accuse	 Viktor	 Yanukovych	 of	











4	 Рада призначила новий уряд: список міністрів,	 11/03/2010,	TCH,	http://
tsn.ua/ukrayina/rada-priznachila-novii-uryad.html
5	 The	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 regarding	 the	 manner	
in	 which	 the	 2004	 changes	 were	 made,	 were	 well-founded.	 For	 more,	 see	





















preventing	 any	 real	 reform	 during	 Yushchenko’s	 presidency.	
Ukraine’s	1996	constitution,	restored	in	2010,	provides	for	a	more	












the	 responsibilities	 of	 those	who	kept	 their	 posts.	A	number	 of	




however,	 that	 in	most	 cases	 the	 changes	were	merely	 cosmetic.	




servants8	 and	 it	 is	hard	 to	 talk	 about	qualitative	 changes	or	 in-
creased	efficiency	of	the	respective	ministries.
7	 УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ № 1085/2010 Про оптимізацію системи 
центральних органів виконавчої влади, Президент України Віктор Яну-


















of	a	 large	administrative	overhaul,	which	would	 lead	 to	 the	de-
centralisation	of	power	and	be	linked	to	a	long	overdue	local	gov-
ernment	reform9.	However,	despite	being	a	long-standing	slogan	










tutional	 (including,	 the	so-called	Cabinet	Bill	of	 7	October	2010,	
which	gives	the	president	powers	to	appoint	even	deputy	minis-
ters	 and	deputy	heads	of	 other	 central	 government	bodies).	To-





instead	of	the	30%	requested	by	the	president.	ГНСУ лишь на треть выпол-





ДЕРЖАВНА СЛУЖБА В ЦИФРАХ	2012,	http://issuu.com/faina/docs/ds__v_
c2012?mode=window&pageNumber=6
9	 See:	Урядовий Кур’єр, Спеціяльний Випуск, 31.05.2012: Адміністратив-
на реформа: нова архітектура держуправління і територіальної органі-
зації влади:	 http://ukurier.gov.ua/media/documents/2012/05/30/admin-
spez.pdf
10	 See:	Административная реформа, или Обратно в СССР, Зеркало недели. 




























the	 campaign	 pledge	 was	 delivered	 when	 the	 Verkhovna	 Rada	













































No	 investigations	were	 launched	 by	Ukraine’s	 law	 enforcement	
authorities,	however,	concerning	a	series	of	scandals	which	sur-
faced	after	Yanukovych	came	to	power.	Media	reports	often	high-














13	 Ильченко Александр, Рафал Анастасия, Волге шьют взятку на полмилли-

























The	 continued	 lack	 of	 effective	 anti-corruption	 measures	 in	
Ukraine	has	translated	into	the	country’s	performance	in	inter-
national	corruption	perceptions	rankings.	In	the	2011	Transpar-
ency	 International	 Corruption	 Perceptions	 Index,	 Kiev	 ranked	
152nd	out	of	183	countries,	receiving	just	2.3	out	of	10	points15.	As	
shown	 in	Figure	 1,	 the	situation	has	been	steadily	deteriorating	
since	2006,	when	Ukraine	recorded	its	best	result	ever.	It	is	clear,	
however,	that	corruption	has	been	a	big	problem	not	only	for	the	




















































reported	 that	bribery	was	commonplace	 in	Ukraine.	More	 than	
half	of	them	(55%)	believed	that	in	2011	the	situation	had	got	even	










of	 exemptions	 to	 the	 bidding	 process,	 thus	 creating	 conditions	



















amendment	 to	 the	Public	Procurement	Act,	which	 repealed	 the	
mandatory	tendering	procedures	for	state-owned	companies.
Interestingly,	 the	authorities	 are	well	 aware	of	 the	 scale	of	 cor-
ruption	and	 the	damage	 caused	by	 it.	 In	 the	 spring	of	 2012,	 the	








18	 Юлия Рябчун, Во взятках несчастье. Минюст отчитался об уровне кор-
рупции в Украине, Коммерсант-Украина,	 18.04.2012,	 http://www.kom-
mersant.ua/doc/1918091








































Mykola	 Azarov’s	 government,	 which	 came	 to	 power	 in	 March	




the	 IMF.	 In	2010,	 the	government	 resumed	 its	 cooperation	with	
the	IMF	and	was	granted	a	credit	line	of	$15.1	billion.	IMF’s	sup-
port	for	Ukraine	and	favourable	ratings	by	credit	rating	agencies	
















reached	 4.2%	 in	 2010	 and	 5.2%	 in	 2011.	 The	Azarov	 government	
also	managed	to	reduce	the	budget	deficit	to	1.4%	of	GDP.	The	eco-











































is	 short-term	 debt.	 Kiev’s	 falling	 credit	 rating	means	 that	 gov-
ernment	bonds	have	very	high	 interest	rates	 (an	average	of	 14%	
for	domestic	holders).	In	the	last	two	quarters	of	2012,	Ukraine’s	
economic	downturn	has	turned	into	a	full-blown	recession21,	rais-
ing	 concerns	 about	 the	 solvency	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 state	 in	 2013,	
with	 its	highest	 foreign	debt	 repayments	and	 servicing	charges	
in	 years22.	 Given	 the	 deteriorating	 relations	 between	 Kiev	 and	
the	West	(where	economic	problems	are	also	quite	serious),	Rus-
sia	might	turn	out	to	be	the	only	country	willing	to	help	Ukraine.	
21	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 “Ukrainian	 economy	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 recession”,	 OSW	
Commentary,	 21/11/2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2012-11-21/ukrainian-economy-verge-recession













































its	 loans	have	never	been	 conditional	 on	 the	 implementation	of	
unpopular	reforms23.
Meanwhile,	Kiev	has	also	been	facing	a	series	of	other	challeng-





big	 business	 linked	 to	 Viktor	 Yanukovych),	 thereby	 provoking	
many	 SMEs	 into	 evading	 their	 tax	 liabilities.	 Directly	 affected	
by	the	global	economic	crisis,	Ukraine’s	banking	sector	has	been	
described	 by	 international	 financial	 institutions	 as	 the	 weak-
est	 in	 the	 region.	Although	 in	 the	first	half	of	 2012,	 local	banks	






In	 the	autumn	of	 2010,	 the	Verkhovna	Rada	adopted	Ukraine’s	
new	Tax	Code,	consolidating	into	a	single	document	all	the	indi-
vidual	tax	regulations	previously	contained	in	various	statutes.	
Ukraine’s	 previous	 tax	 laws	 had	 been	 described	 as	 among	 the	
most	complex	in	the	world,	and	in	the	World	Bank’s	2010	Doing	
Business	 report,	Ukraine’s	 tax	 system	was	 ranked	 181st	 in	 the	
23	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	 “Ukraine	 is	 becoming	 dependent	 on	Russian	 loans”,	
EastWeek,	 OSW,	 04/04/2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2012-04-04/ukraine-becoming-dependent-russian-loans
















world	 (out	of	 183)25.	The	new	tax	code	has	reduced	 the	number	
of	state	taxes	from	29	to	18,	while	the	number	of	local	taxes	has	
dropped	 from	 14	 to	 5.	 The	 corporate	 income	 tax	 rate	 has	 been	
cut	 from	25%	 in	 2010	down	 to	 21%	 in	 2012	 (towards	 a	 target	 of	
16%	by	2014	–	which	will	make	it	the	lowest	in	Europe).	The	new	
tax	code	has	also	created	two	tax	bands	for	 individual	 taxpay-
ers	at	15%	and	17%,	although	one	of	 its	most	 important	 innova-

















since	 hundreds	 of	 amendments	 have	 already	 been	made	 to	 the	























tax	 avoidance.	 The	main	 positive	 outcome	 of	 the	 reform	 is	 the	
codification	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 tax	 law,	which	 allows	 for	 greater	
transparency.
3. Pension reform
Although	 the	Ukrainian	 state	pension	 is	 relatively	 low,	pension	
spending	remains	a	heavy	burden	on	the	country’s	budget,	with	
the	Ukrainian	Pension	Fund	permanently	in	the	red.	In	2011,	the	
Pension	 Fund’s	 deficit	 reached	 $3.8	 billion,	 which	 amounted	 to	








































































32	 Дефицит Пенсионного фонда Украины будет увеличен почти в два 





































failed	 completely	 in	 this	 area.	 Compared	 to	 2010,	 Ukraine	 has	
slipped	 in	almost	 all	 the	 rankings	of	 economic	 freedom	and	 in-
vestment	conditions33.	A	survey	of	foreign	companies	operating	in	
Ukraine,	 conducted	by	 the	European	Business	Association,	 sug-






























In	 the	 long	 term,	 some	 improvement	 could	 come	 from	 the	 im-
plementation	 of	 the	 2011	 Deep	 and	 Comprehensive	 Free	 Trade	
Area	(DCFTA)	agreement	negotiated	between	Kiev	and	the	Eu-
ropean	 Union	 (initialled	 on	 19	 July	 201235).	 It	 is	 believed	 that	
thanks	 to	 the	 implementation	of	some	parts	of	 the	EU’s	acquis	
communautaire,	 the	 DCFTA	 should	 help	 create	 a	 better	 busi-









tricity	 companies	 and	 the	 natural	 gas	 distribution	 sector.	 In	 both	 cases,	
winning	bids	were	often	unofficially	announced	before	the	bidding	process	
was	 closed.	 Consequently,	Ukraine’s	 big	 business	 (with	 close	 links	 to	 the	
president)	monopolised	both	sectors	 (Rinat	Akhmetov	 took	control	of	 the	
electricity	sector;	while	Dmytro	Firtash	bought	up	Ukraine’s	gas	distribu-
tion	networks).

















5. land market reform
Ukraine	has	some	of	the	most	fertile	soils	in	the	world	and	a	cli-
mate	favourable	to	agriculture.	So	far,	however,	the	food	and	ag-














dismantled	 collective	 farms).	 Farmland	 lease	 agreements	 have	
enabled	 the	 creation	of	 large-scale	 farms	and	agricultural	 com-
panies,	some	of	which	now	control	hundreds	of	thousands	of	hec-
tares	 of	 agricultural	 land.	 It	 has	 been	 estimated	 that	 Ukraine’s	
twenty	 largest	 agricultural	 companies	 are	 currently	 leasing	 an	
area	equal	to	the	size	of	Belgium36.	The	creation	of	“super	farms”	
in	Ukraine	is	a	characteristic	feature	of	the	way	in	which	this	sec-
tor	has	been	developing	since	 the	 1990s,	and	 it	also	sets	out	 the	
likely	direction	of	its	further	development.























lost	 their	 influence.	 In	addition,	although	the	Ukrainian	society	
is	split	on	the	issue	(roughly	in	half),	it	seems	that	the	reform	at-
tracts	less	controversy	than	in	the	1990s.	Significant	progress	was	
made	with	 the	passing	of	 the	Land	Register	bill	 in	August	2011,	
which	introduced	a	simplified	mechanism	for	the	keeping	of	land	




Ukraine	–	 this	 is	 the	 last	of	 the	bills,	without	which	a	 free	 land	
market	could	not	be	established.	Under	the	proposed	law,	Ukrain-





































Consequently,	 the	Party	of	Regions	has	decided	 to	postpone	 the	





















1. gas sector reform
One	 of	 the	main	 causes	 of	 Kiev’s	 financial	 difficulties	 has	 been	
the	high	price	of	natural	gas	imported	from	Russia	–	the	source	
of	about	two	thirds	of	all	gas	consumed	in	Ukraine.	The	current	
pricing	 formula	used	by	 the	Russians,	however,	 is	based	on	 the	
2009	gas	 contracts	 signed	by	 former	Ukrainian	Prime	Minister	











tions	 on	 the	 energy	 sector.	 The	 first	 document	 paving	 the	way	
for	such	cooperation	was	adopted	by	Tymoshenko’s	government	
back	in	March	2009.	At	the	time,	the	EU	and	Ukraine	signed	the	


























to	 the	outbreak	of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 in	Ukraine	and	 the	 start	
of	another	election	campaign,	the	government	in	Kiev	never	even	
started	the	reforms.
Later,	 Yanukovych’s	 government	 did	 implement	 some	 changes	

















responsible	 for	 transit	 (namely,	 the	 pipelines	 carrying	 Russian	
gas	to	the	rest	of	Europe).	In	June	2012,	the	government	separated	
from	Naftogaz	 two	 of	 its	 subsidiaries:	Ukrtranshaz	 responsible	




kan	states,	 as	well	 as	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	Kiev	has	agreed	 to	adopt	EU	
regulations	(the	so-called	third	energy	package)	by	January	2015).






















that	 the	 reform	will	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 re-
quirements	of	the	Energy	Community,	although	Russia	will	un-
doubtedly	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 reform.	 Yanukovych’s	
ministers	have	been	trying	to	renegotiate	the	unfavourable	con-
ditions	 agreed	 in	 the	 2009	 gas	 contracts	 –	 albeit	without	much	
success.	 In	 exchange	 for	 such	 concessions	 (including	 lower	 gas	













decisions,	 including	 significant	 gas	 price	 hikes	 for	 individual	
consumers	and	district	heating	schemes,	as	part	of	a	comprehen-
sive	 strategy	 to	modernise	 Ukraine’s	municipal	 housing	 sector.	






president’s	plans	was	 to	be	established	by	 the	end	of	 2010).	The	























2. attempts to diversify ukraine’s gas supplies
Ukraine	has	one	of	 the	most	 energy-intensive	economies	 in	 the	




ernments	 in	Kiev	have	been	 stressing	 the	need	 to	diversify	 the	
country’s	energy	supply	(especially	gas)	but	little	has	been	done	to	
put	words	into	action.	Initially,	after	taking	power	in	2010,	Viktor	
Yanukovych	and	his	government	did	not	 treat	 this	matter	 seri-
ously:	the	president’s	2010	reform	programme	made	no	mention	
of	the	need	for	the	diversification	of	Ukraine’s	gas	supplies.	Kiev’s	















































In	November	2012,	Ukraine	was	able	 to,	 for	 the	first	 time	 in	 its	
history,	 successfully	 import	gas	 from	across	 its	western	border.	



































tic	 production.	 Currently,	 locally	 extracted	 gas	 can	meet	 about	
a	third	of	the	country’s	annual	gas	needs.	A	rise	in	domestic	pro-


















































2010);	 of	 this,	 26	billion	m3	was	purchased	under	 the	Naftogaz-
Gazprom	contract.	In	view	of	the	continuing	high	prices	Ukraine	
has	to	pay	Russia	for	its	gas,	Kiev	has	indicated	that	in	2013	Naf-
togaz	might	 reduce	 the	 level	of	Russian	gas	 imports	down	to	as	
little	as	20	billion	m3.	The	resulting	gas	shortage	on	the	Ukrainian	
energy	market	could	then	be	filled	thanks	to	 the	“reverse-flow”	































iV. assessment of the current situation 
and ProsPects for the future
1. assessment of the current situation 
A	return	 to	 the	presidential	 system,	coupled	with	a	 stable	and	
disciplined	parliamentary	majority,	has	given	President	Viktor	
Yanukovych	 unprecedented	 political	 powers.	 Even	 President	
Kuchma,	who	enjoyed	equally	extensive	powers	but	was	stalled	
by	the	 fragmentation	of	his	political	base,	could	not	match	Ya-
nukovych’s	 capacity	 for	 implementing	 change.	 The	 concentra-
tion	 of	 power	 and	 relative	 stability	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 economy	
between	2010-2011,	created	ideal	conditions	for	the	implementa-
tion	of	the	deep	reforms	proposed	by	the	president	in	2010.	Ya-

















of	 Ukraine’s	 gas	 supplies,	 although	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
























On	 the	 other	 hand,	most	 areas	 of	 life	 in	 Ukraine	 have	 seen	 no	
significant	 change	under	Yanukovych,	while	 in	many	other	 ar-
eas	the	situation	has	deteriorated.	Contrary	to	the	official	policy	
of	 liberalisation	 and	deregulation	 of	 the	 economy,	 protectionist	
tendencies	favouring	big	business	linked	to	the	president	and	his	








On	 the	 whole	 therefore	 Yanukovych’s	 performance	 between	
2010	 and	 2012	 leaves	 much	 to	 be	 desired.	 And	 although	 after	
coming	to	power,	the	current	government	did	implement	some	

























tially	 seen	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	
real	reforms	in	the	country,	was	subsequently	used	to	gradually	

















2. Prospects for the future






































of	 the	 Ukrainian	 opposition,	 could	 drastically	 reduce	 Yanuko-










the	 current	 moratorium	 until	 2016	 suggests	 the	 possibility	 of	
a	long	and	fierce	debate	in	Parliament,	coinciding	with	a	presiden-
tial	campaign.
It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 as	 we	 move	 closer	 to	 the	 2015	 presidential	
election,	 the	 government	 will	 take	 any	 unpopular	 decisions	 or	




























of	 the	Ukrainian	oligarchs	 (which	could	be	caused	by	 the	deep-
ening	economic	crisis	and	the	need	for	radical	action	to	increase	
state	revenues)	would	leave	Yanukovych	at	Russia’s	mercy.	Mos-
cow’s	help	would	 likely	 come	with	 specific	 conditions	 attached,	
including	membership	of	 the	Customs	Union,	which	would	end	
Ukraine’s	current	pro-EU	foreign	policy.










and	 the	 opposition	will	 call	 for	 a	 change	 of	 leadership,	without	
a	coherent	plan	for	what	to	do	next.	It	has	become	quite	difficult	
50	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	“Oligarchic	democracy”,	OSW	Studies,	p.	46.
51	 A	 statement	by	Oleksandr	Turchynov,	 one	of	 the	 leaders	of	 the	Batkivsh-
chyna	party.	Турчинов пообещал отменить пенсионную реформу и лик-



















Meanwhile,	 radical	 reforms	 in	 Ukraine	 are	 essential,	 as	 Kiev	
lags	ever	further	behind	the	rest	of	Europe	(currently	only	Mol-
dova	 and	 Kosovo	 are	 poorer).	 Immediately	 after	 independence,	











comes	 to	 modernisation	 and	 economic	 development,	 Ukraine’s	




sławomir matuszaK, arKadiusz sarna
52	 In	2011,	Ukraine’s	GDP	per capita	was	$3615.	In	Bulgaria	and	Poland	the	figure	
stood	at	$7158	and	$13463	respectively.	Source:	World	Development	Indica-
tors	 &	 Global	 Development	 Finance,	World	 Bank,	 http://databank.world-
bank.org/ddp/home.do
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